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THE POLITICS OF AESTHETIC AFFECT
—A RECONSTRUCTION OF HABERMAS’ ART THEORY
Geoff  Boucher
Raymond Williams once declared that works of  art—he was speaking specifically of  literary works, but the claim 
has broader implications—are “structures of  feeling,” not “pictures of  reality.”1 The politics of  art therefore 
result from a politicised understanding of  the ways in which the judgement of  taste is shaped by hegemonic 
norms of  interpretation, where the common-sense of  an historical epoch supplies, at the unconscious level, a 
typology of  judgements that delimits possible constructions of  meaning. New semantic contents, he proposed, 
released new feelings, promoting constructions of  subjectivity that potentially defied conventional identities and 
commonsensical evaluations of  works.2 But this penetrating insight, so different from subsequent efforts to direct 
a politicisation of  aesthetics through cognitive forms of  ideology critique, was only cashed out by Williams in 
terms of  “residual,” “dominant,” and “emergent” cultural structures.3 The linear and progressive notion of  
history implied by these categories mortgages a politicisation of  aesthetics to the conceptual framework of  a 
philosophy of  history, which is driven by an historical teleology that is no longer credible. 
As part of  a larger project of  developing a critique of  the contemporary Frankfurt School, and particularly the 
work of  Jürgen Habermas, I want to draw attention in this connection to his aesthetics. Habermas’s art theory 
attempts, from a post-metaphysical perspective, to concretise the emancipatory intentions of  Critical Theory 
through understanding artworks as structures of  feeling. Here is a project, then, that takes up the same sort 
of  insight as that of  Williams, yet which tries to develop it without reference to metaphysical teleology and 
the utopian idea that art anticipates a de-alienated society. And so I find myself  in the paradoxical position of  
wanting to defend Habermas in the process of  developing a critique of  him along the following lines: this is one 
baby that should not be thrown out with the bathwater.
According to Habermas, a distinct aesthetic rationality exists, as one dimension of  what he calls communicative 
reason, with responsibility for the experimental expression of  human needs. The knowledge that autonomous 
artworks provide is affective and non-propositional, but has the power to catalyse a shift in the motivational 
structures of  individuals. By effecting transformations of  individuals’ relationship to the cultural interpretation 
of  human needs, artworks promote the maturation of  the person’s subjectivity and provide the motivational 
structures necessary for moral autonomy and scientific thinking. These links between happiness and worthiness, 
and between well-being and decentred cognition, are crucial components of  discursive will-formation and 
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therefore of  democratic politics. 
What Habermas is proposing, then, is that artworks are not primarily “ways of  seeing,” that is, vehicles for 
truth claims modelled on cognitive truth, but feeling complexes, whose truthfulness involves a distinct sort of  
non-cognitive—but certainly not irrational—claim. This is a provocative and interesting contention whose 
implications are potentially far-reaching. First, it means that artworks are more than just intelligible to the 
interpreter: they are rational because they stake a claim to a kind of  truth. Authentic art cannot be ignored but 
should instead be placed on the same level of  cultural importance as discoveries in the natural sciences and 
the major moral theories of  modernity. Second, it links this claim to truthfulness to the exploration of  human 
needs, proposing a substantive, rather than a formalist, interpretation of  artistic modernism and the avant-garde 
movements. What Habermas calls, appropriating Weber, “an innovative revivification of  experience” through 
aesthetic experimentation is entirely connected to “the interpretation of  needs, that colour our perceptions” of  
the world, so that artistic value (beauty, sublimity, innovation) cannot be disjoined from the disclosure of  socially 
silenced human needs.4 
Yet unlike Adorno, this does not mean that formal aesthetic radicalism automatically equals a radical politics, 
or that aesthetic autonomy is a placemarker for moral autonomy under conditions of  the pervasiveness of  the 
culture industries and the administered society. That is because, third, what the connection between aesthetic 
innovation and the disclosure of  needs makes possible is a reflexive relation to that cultural tradition that serves 
the individual as a repository of  need interpretations. Autonomous art shakes the foundations of  conventional 
ego formations and catalyses a shift in the motivational structures of  the entire personality, so that through 
aesthetic experience “traditional cultural contents are no longer simply the stencils according to which needs 
are shaped; on the contrary, in this medium, needs can seek and find adequate interpretations.”5 Finally, 
artworks bring “linguistically excommunicated” human needs into cultural debates and challenge conventional 
ascriptions of  the sorts of  personal self-realisation that will satisfy (or silence) these needs. That, in turn, means 
that the “politics of  affect” have nothing to do with the critical assignment of  programmatic political positions 
to aesthetic forms, because all art can do is shift the individual’s relation to their culturally-interpreted inner 
nature, providing the motivational dispositions that are preconditions for a radically democratic politics, but not 
the politics themselves. 
Therefore, the real political question about art is whether the institutions of  modern art can have a structure-
forming effect on the lifeworld, in ways that can release the gain in rationality that autonomous artworks 
represent into the life histories (and personality structures) of  modern individuals. Can autonomous art really 
shake the foundations of  those conventional identities that are today the mass base for revivals of  religious 
fundamentalism, authoritarian tendencies in contemporary democracies, and culturally conservative refusals of  
the sexual revolution? Unfortunately, this is as much a question for Habermas as a question posed by his work. 
For no sooner had Habermas articulated a sketch of  the mature version of  this aesthetic theory, in the two 
volumes of  his Theory of  Communicative Action [1979] (1984, 1987) (hereafter, TCA), than he began to retreat from 
this position. Today, after successive revisions and reconsiderations, although he continues to maintain that art 
(specifically, literature) is the equal of  science and normative universality, it no longer stakes a truth claim, solves 
problems to do with the understanding of  inner nature, or makes the same sort of  social contribution to the 
project of  modernity that science and morality make. Literature and criticism “administer capacities for world-
disclosure” while science and morality “administer capacities for problem solving,” because art and literature 
involve a world-disclosing use of  language entirely unlike the informal logic of  argument that constitutes 
communicative reason.6 
In this article, I intend to confront Habermas’s own reasons for abandoning what I take to be an interesting 
and promising position. For I will demonstrate that, not only are his radical and provocative claims defensible, 
but, given the conceptual architecture of  The Theory of  Communicative Action, Habermas retreats from these 
claims at his own peril. In a nutshell, if  aesthetic rationality-gains in the “linguistification of  inner nature” 
cannot be released in modernity, then the neoconservative cultural commentators are actually right.7 Modern 
THE POLITICS OF AESTHETIC AFFECT  
art would then be negatively critical without being able to replace the motivational structures hitherto supplied 
by cultural traditions and religious worldviews. Instead of  being an “unfinished project,” modernity would be 
an inconsistent form of  life. But, as I will show, Habermas’s position need not collapse. 
THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AESTHETIC TRADITION
If  the first generation of  the Frankfurt School can be considered to be Weberian Marxists, because of  their 
interpretation of  rationalisation as reification, then Habermas is surely a Marxist Weberian, who interprets 
reification as an effect of  unbalanced rationalisation. To understand the profound effect that this has on 
his aesthetic theory, it is necessary to recognise that Frankfurt School approaches to art are constituted by a 
dialectical tension between two poles. These poles are art as an anticipation of  human and social wholeness 
(“totality”) and art as critical self-reflection (“reflexivity”), which themselves spring from the Hegelian-Marxist 
and Kantian-Weberian approaches to art, respectively.8 Habermas’s central claim about art is the Weber-
influenced one that with the modern separation of  cultural value spheres into autonomous domains of  science, 
morality, and art, and the reflexive application of  artistic techniques, art becomes an aesthetic laboratory for 
the exploration of  “decentred unbound subjectivity.”9 But that should not be taken to mean, as it too often is, 
that Habermas entirely rejects the idea that art illuminates the totality of  an historical lifeworld, or even that 
art cannot anticipate the formal structures of  a better world. It only means that art does not anticipate a single 
substantive totality supposed to provide the normative goal for all of  humanity.10 
Further, because Habermas’s defense of  autonomous art means endorsement of  the idea that aesthetic 
specialisation arises from expert knowledge about the expressive dimension of  speech, his position on aesthetic 
rationality in TCA is often misunderstood. For instance, John Thompson and Jonathan Culler both think that 
this is the idea that artworks are a form of  subjective self-expression governed by the validity claim of  authorial 
sincerity.11 Viewed against the background of  the Frankfurt School tradition in aesthetics, however, this is 
an implausible construction of  Habermas’s position. For it then soon becomes evident that the defense of  
autonomous art is a defense of  the liberating power of  authentic artworks to disclose silenced human needs. 
In fact, Habermas’s position blends aspects of  Marcuse’s psychoanalytic understanding of  bourgeois realism, 
Adorno’s modernist formalism and Benjamin’s democratic preference for popular culture in a complicated 
synthesis.12  
From Marcuse, Habermas adopts the idea that the artwork, as a release of  the pleasure principle in the context 
of  a representation of  social reality, creates an aesthetic illusion whose separation from a society organised 
by the reality principle of  instrumental reason at once constitutes an escapist compensation for lives ruled by 
the work ethic, and a promise of  happiness that indicts real social suffering. Art intends to “redeem a promise 
of  happiness” whose “superabundance radiates beyond art,” because it alludes to a real need for a balanced 
relation to nature, especially human nature.13 This implies a demand for intersubjective structures of  mutual 
recognition within which the satisfaction of  all is a condition of  the satisfaction of  each, something that defines 
a meaningful life in terms of  participation in the social conditions required for human flourishing. 
Although Habermas is highly suspicious of  Adorno’s hermetic modernism and the “philosophical extravagance” 
of  Adorno’s quasi-teleological notion of  reconciliation (a naturalistic adaptation of  Hegel’s concept of  
Versöhnung, reconciliation), perhaps surprisingly, Habermas endorses two Adornian tenets of  art criticism. These 
are that technical rationalisation, although not to be conflated with artistic content, is an essential precondition 
for aesthetic innovation, and that what this aesthetic innovation unlocks is a complex experience of  latent 
expressive potentials that have been socially suppressed or blocked by one-sided rationalisation.14  
Finally, Habermas adopts from Benjamin not only a preference for collectively received popular art, said to 
be capable of  yielding a “secular illumination” of  the expressive potentials in aesthetic experience that are 
otherwise concealed in religious art or locked away in modernism, but also the notion that art involves a 
complex experience whose root is in human needs. For Habermas, as for Benjamin, the expressive dimension 
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of  language derives from the material substrate of  human nature, which means that the mimetic deployment 
of  language expresses “a historically changing interpretation of  needs” rooted in biology.15 On this basis, 
Habermas develops a series of  striking formulations that go right to the heart of  his aesthetic project. “Could 
an emancipated humanity,” he asks rhetorically:
One day confront itself  in the expanded scope of  discursive will-formation and nevertheless still be 
deprived of  the terms in which it is able to interpret life as good life? A culture which, for thousands 
of  years, was exploited for the purpose of  legitimating domination would take its revenge, just at the 
moment when age-old repressions could be overcome: not only would it be free of  violence, it would 
no longer have any content.16 
Habermas responds that only the “store of  semantic energies” that criticism must redeem from aesthetic 
traditions holds the answer to this question, for “we need those rescued semantic potentials if  we are to interpret 
the world in terms of  our own needs, and only if  the source of  these potentials does not run dry can the claim 
to happiness be fulfilled.”17 This not only makes aesthetic expression the guardian of  those hopes that articulate 
a demand for human happiness, but also means that artistic mimesis humanises the world, because it represents 
an anthropocentric projection of  human needs onto the world considered as a context of  potential satisfaction. 
Habermas’s defence of  authentic art must not be confused with a preference for hermetic forms of  modernism. 
Consonant with his egalitarian concern for the release of  rationality potentials from expert cultures into the 
everyday fabric of  the modern lifeworld, Habermas’s hopes are pinned to the “post-avant-garde” of  the 1970s 
and 1980s, rather than the interwar modernists. Referencing Peter Bürger’s Theory of  the Avant-Garde (1978), 
Habermas maintains that the (then new) art movement “is characterised by the coexistence of  tendencies toward 
realism and engagement with those authentic continuations of  modern art that distilled out the independent 
logic of  the aesthetic.”18 Thus, the post-avant-garde unites modernist aesthetic forms with the representation of  
society characteristic of  realism, bringing cognitive and moral elements into connection with the aesthetic in a 
way that is experimental yet accessible.19 Although Habermas is parsimonious with names here, his description 
of  the post-avant-garde coincides with the main features of  what has been called “resistance postmodernism,” 
aesthetic strategies that situate themselves on the frontier between popular culture and the avant-garde, in the 
wake of  modernism. Examples are Cindy Sherman and Richard Hamilton, in the visual arts, and Donald 
Barthelme, Thomas Pynchon, and Robert Coover in literature.20 Habermas’s preference for the aesthetic 
strategies of  the post-avant-garde imply that his defence of  autonomous art is rather different from what he 
describes as Adorno’s “hibernation strategy,” which proposed that authentic modernist art must cultivate a 
rebarbative and dissonant aesthetics in order to resist capture by the commodified “culture industries.”21 
Habermas therefore has a complex but definite relation to the Frankfurt School aesthetic tradition, for which 
“authentic art” means an art that expresses historically legitimate but socially silenced human needs, and 
thereby articulates a demand for happiness. Accordingly, it is not surprising that his understanding of  expressive 
language centres on the fate of  the poetic faculty whereby “human beings interpret the world in terms of  their 
own needs.”22  
FOCUSING THE SCOPE OF AESTHETIC RATIONALITY
The idea of  art as an expressive repository of  socially silenced human needs remains a constant in Habermas’s 
defense of  autonomous art from neoconservative cultural critics. Yet because Habermas positions this within an 
understanding of  modernity derived from Weber, the framework for that defence is different from that of  the 
first generation of  the Frankfurt School. Instead of  stressing art’s power to critique the reified social totality in 
light of  an image of  human wholeness, Habermas emphasises the legitimacy of  the autonomous cultural value 
sphere of  the aesthetic. As this perspective matures in the lead up to TCA, the primary focus of  the defence shifts 
away from the idea that the historically developed human needs expressed in authentic artworks indict the social 
limitations and cultural fragmentation produced by instrumental reason. Rather, the main argument becomes 
THE POLITICS OF AESTHETIC AFFECT  
that cultural specialisation in the expression of  needs potentially augments the ability of  modern individuals to 
exercise their autonomy, because aesthetic debates contribute to clarifying the interests of  actors pragmatically 
seeking to coordinate action around a value consensus. In other words, autonomous art represents a potential 
rationality gain in the specific department of  reason for which the aesthetic sphere is responsible. 
In Legitimation Crisis, written around the same time as the essay on Walter Benjamin already cited, Habermas 
accepted the argument of  neoconservative critics such as Daniel Bell that there is a “divergence between the 
values offered by the socio-cultural system and those demanded by the political and economic systems,” but he 
disagreed vehemently with their negative evaluation.23 From this perspective:
Bourgeois art has become the refuge for a satisfaction, even if  only virtual, of  those needs that have 
become, as it were, illegal in the material life-process of  bourgeois society. I refer here to the desire 
for a mimetic relation with nature; the need for living together in solidarity outside the group egoism 
of  the immediate family; the longing for the happiness of  a communicative experience exempt from 
imperatives of  purposive rationality and giving scope to imagination as well as spontaneity.24
I will return to the medley of  different sorts of  “needs” that are here in a moment. Habermas then goes 
on to restate the Frankfurt School’s analysis of  the split within bourgeois “affirmative culture,” between art’s 
potentially critical promise of  happiness and the ideological effect of  the aesthetic illusion as an apology for 
actual dissatisfaction. This, he argues, brings to light “the truth … that in bourgeois society art expresses not 
the promise but the irretrievable sacrifice of  bourgeois rationalisation,” so that the radicalised art movements 
of  aestheticism and then the avant-garde represent a counter-cultural protest “hostile to the possessive-
individualistic … lifestyle of  the bourgeoisie.”25 
This analysis is carried forward into the same year as the publication of  TCA, when, in “Modernity versus 
Postmodernity,” Habermas again confronts Bell in the same terms as before. He argues that Surrealism marks 
the moment when the opposition between the affirmative deployment of  art’s promise of  happiness in mass 
culture and the critical negativity of  a hermetic modernism’s denunciation of  actual unhappiness in high art 
becomes intolerable. This premature effort to “blow up the autarkical sphere of  art and force a reconciliation 
between art and life” misfires, not only because an anti-art aesthetic is a performative contradiction, but 
also because this conflates “aesthetic judgement with the expression of  subjective experiences.”26 “When the 
containers of  an autonomous cultural sphere [such as art] are shattered,” Habermas argues, “the contents [just] 
get dispersed,” not released into the everyday.27 
The demand for happiness, which in autonomous art is carried forward as the implied ideal that licenses a 
critical negation of  unsatisfied needs, cannot be redeemed through the direct aestheticisation of  everyday life. 
The “specialised treatment of  autonomous problems” in art production implies an experimental rationality 
dedicated to the refinement of  the means of  expression of  human needs. The gains from this expert culture 
can only be released through their translation into publically accessible propositions about identity formation 
and shareable experience, and the integration of  these into individuals’ life histories and shared culture. “A 
reified everyday praxis can only be cured by creating unconstrained interaction of  the cognitive with the moral-
practical and the aesthetic-expressive elements [of  the culture of  modernity]. Reification cannot be overcome 
by forcing just one of  those highly stylised cultural spheres to open up and become more accessible.”28 
Notice, though, that this claim is again framed in Weberian terms of  the release of  rationality potentials 
through cultural specialisation rather than the redemption of  a promise of  wholeness through the revolutionary 
de-alienation of  society. But this is incompatible with the earlier claim cited above that art is a bearer for 
the desire for an authentic relation to the natural world, for a moral “need” for social solidarity, and for a 
demand for happiness that only a radically transformed society could satisfy. Such a medley of  “needs” only 
fits with the model of  art as totality, as a utopian anticipation of  a reconciled form of  life. Not surprisingly, 
then, as Habermas shifts from art as a pre-political means for raising political questions, to art as a cultural 
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specialisation, his account of  the needs that art expresses becomes increasingly focused. The scope of  his claim 
shrinks from “raising matters of  general concern” (which the eighteenth century republic of  letters is said to 
do) to mapping the shared experiences of  the “subjective world” (which modernist art is said to accomplish).
THE NEED IN ART
This mapping of  the subjective world (or “inner nature”) and its relation to the objective world of  the natural 
environment and the social world of  normatively regulated interaction is most fully explored in the long article 
on “Moral Development and Ego Identity.”29 There, Habermas advances the notion of  the maturity of  the 
ego (or “ego identity”) as the criterion by which to measure the rationality gains made in science, morality, and 
art in the modern world. The concept of  ego identity—a psychoanalytically-derived and post-metaphysical 
replacement for idealist notions of  the autonomy of  the transcendental subject—is the enlightenment ideal the 
unconstrained communication presupposes.30 Ego identity means the ability to narrate a unique life history as 
a developmental sequence “under the guidance of  general principles and modes of  procedure,” within which 
impulse satisfactions are integrated with cognitive and moral accomplishments.31 Accordingly, ego identity 
integrates the three aspects of  personality development which relate to the three referential worlds of  external 
nature, internal nature, and the social world: cognitive development, moral development, and motivational 
development. In a characteristic schematising move, Habermas proposes that the general stages of  development 
in each aspect of  personality are all reciprocal preconditions of  one another, so that the structures of  the ego 
can be clearly related to degrees of  reflexivity.32 Abstracting from the discussion and summarising:
The exact details of  Piaget and Kohlberg’s developmental models need not detain us here. In relation to 
motivational structures, Habermas’s reconstruction of  the ego-psychological, object-relations, interactional-
psychological, and empirical-developmental literature is exhaustive (and exhausting), but its main thrust is a 
prolongation of  his discussion of  psychoanalysis in Knowledge and Human Interests. The quasi-biological notion 
of  instinctual impulses must be replaced by the notion of  the psychic representation of  drives acquired via the 
process of  socialisation, without this losing its conceptual connection to its somatic basis in the natural body. 
Habermas describes these as “cultural need-interpretations” and rejects the idea that the dynamics of  these 
drives can be described through the notion of  libido.34 Instead, focusing on clinical practice, Habermas argues 
that these are best described linguistically, in terms of  culturally symbolised motivations arising from socialised 
External nature 
(Cognitive development via Piaget)
Social world (morality)
(Moral development via Kohlberg)
Internal nature (motivation)
(Motivational development via 
reconstructive argument)33
Stage I
Pre-operational
Stage I
Pre-conventional
Stage I
Egocentric pleasure/pain continuum
Stage II
Concrete-operational
Stage II
Conventional
Stage II
Quasi-natural “culturally interpreted 
needs, [whose] satisfaction depends 
on following socially recognised 
expectations” 
Stage III
Formal-operational
Stage III
Post-conventional
Stage III
Post-traditional “critique and justification 
of  need interpretations” as action 
orientating motivations 
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need interpretations, and repressed material with the character of  “linguistically excommunicated” need in-
terpretations.35 Motivational development consists of  integrating repressed components into the individual’s 
narration of  their life history, which is equivalent to a dismantling of  ego defences and a reduction of  superego 
pressure, together with the global restricting of  the ego to reflect a new relation to interpreted needs.36 In short, 
the mature ego is capable of  re-integrating formerly repressed inclinations into socially legitimate motivational 
dispositions by means of  a critique of  the limitations of  their cultural tradition.37 This conception of  ego flex-
ibility in terms of  a reflexive relation to motivational dispositions then connects with flexibility toward cognitive 
and normative questions. These strictly defined stages of  development all express a reflexive de-centring of  ex-
perience where persons become capable of  adopting hypothetical attitudes toward the natural world, taking up 
the moral positions of  others, and considering the need-interpretations of  other cultures (or counter-cultures) 
as potentially valid. 
Habermas denies that this position on psychoanalytic theory and motivational development, which replaces 
“drive energies with interpreted needs and … instinctual vicissitudes … [with] identity formation” vaporises 
everything “into a culturalist haze” reminiscent of, for instance, Erich Fromm.38 This is because “this change 
in perspective does not entail the elimination of  inner nature as an extralinguistic referent.”39 Although that 
rejoinder seems adequate, the accent in Habermas’s account falls on the reciprocal relations between cognitive, 
normative, and motivational components of  the total personality, in ways that suggest that “ego identity” is too 
restricted a description of  the global restructuring of  subjectivity that he seeks. 
Nonetheless, Habermas clearly relates the acquisition of  post-traditional need-interpretations, with their ac-
companying flexible motivational structures, to the potential effects of  autonomous artworks. 
Inner nature is rendered communicatively fluid and transparent to the extent that needs can, through 
aesthetic forms of  expression, be kept articulable or be released from their paleosymbolic pre-linguis-
ticality. But that means that internal nature is not subjected, in the cultural preformation met with 
at any given time, to the demands of  ego autonomy; rather, through a dependent ego it obtains free 
access to the interpretive possibilities of  the cultural tradition. In the medium of  value-forming and 
norm-forming communications in which aesthetic experiences enter, traditional cultural contents are 
no longer simply the stencils according to which needs are shaped; on the contrary, in this medium, 
needs can seek and find adequate interpretations.40
Habermas’s defense of  autonomous art in terms of  its ability to articulate silenced needs has now taken shape. 
The power and significance of  autonomous art is its capacity to bring into communicative circulation those lin-
guistically excommunicated need-interpretations, those desires and feelings, which were split off  in the process 
of  socialisation. This happened because socialisation involved the internationalisation of  the expectations of  
others, framed not as intersubjective agreements, but as quasi-natural imperatives backed by superego recrimi-
nations. The strong feelings that autonomous art unleashes are the product of  its expression of  these needs in 
ways that interrogate quasi-natural cultural traditions and rigid ego identities, thereby potentially catalysing a 
dramatic alteration in the motivational dispositions of  modern individuals. Art is not responsible for figuratively 
representing the general will (or more softly, raising matters of  general concern), or for a utopian anticipation 
of  a reconciled totality. Instead, its task is, in Kafka’s words, to “break up the frozen sea within”41: to loosen the 
reified grip of  cultural traditions over need-interpretations and therefore to explore alternative forms of  self-
realization as new pathways to human happiness. 
THE DIALECTIC OF AUTONOMY
The fact that Habermas affirms that autonomous art—aesthetic experimentation conducted within a relatively 
separate cultural value sphere that is exempted from the demands of  everyday pragmatics and the requirements 
of  utility42—has a legitimate role to play in modernity, does not mean that he subscribes to a naïve estimation of  
its ability to fulfil this mandate under reified cultural conditions. But these reservations need to be understood 
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in a systematic context. 
Habermas’s recasting of  the idea of  reification as a theory of  the “colonisation of  the lifeworld by the system” 
is relatively well known, so I will not tire the reader by rehearsing the argument in detail. Suffice it to say for 
present purposes that the core idea is the problematic intrusion of  the logic of  the anonymous functional 
social systems of  economy and administration, into social processes of  renewing cultural knowledge, social 
norms and socialised personalities that can only be successfully performed through communicative interaction. 
Communicative action (action coordination through reaching mutual agreement) and communicative reason 
(the suspension of  the speech pragmatics of  communicative action for a reflexive interrogation of  proposals for 
mutual agreement through dialogical argumentation) are the substrate of  that horizon of  expectations that is 
the endangered lifeworld. Communicative reason drives a multidimensional process of  cultural rationalisation 
that theories of  reification had falsely diagnosed as “cultural fragmentation,” because these (Hegelian-Marxist) 
positions had mistaken effects of  system colonisation for problems inherent to the modern lifeworld.
Habermas’s position on the tension between processes of  societal rationalisation (functional differentiation of  
social systems) and cultural rationalisation (the separation of  cultural value spheres) is the key to his account of  
aesthetic rationality. The core of  this position is the Weberian claim in descriptive sociology that with the decline 
of  religious worldviews and the disenchantment of  nature, the distinct cultural value spheres of  science, law and 
post-conventional morality, and art/criticism, emerge. These become autonomous domains of  cultural inquiry 
whose institutionalisation allows the independent logic of  value-enhancement in their respective domains to 
connect with social learning processes. On Habermas’s interpretation, each of  these value spheres operates 
according to the distinctive logics of  cognitive (science), normative (law and morals), and expressive (aesthetic) 
reasoning, governed by the particular procedures by which their defining validity claims of  truth (cognitive), 
rightness (normative), and truthfulness (aesthetic) are articulated symbolically and redeemed argumentatively. 
Because these domains are institutionalised as specialised forms of  inquiry, liberated from religion, protected 
from the pragmatic pressures of  everyday communicative action, and purified from the intrusive predominance 
of  one another’s validity claims, they can develop expert knowledge about the objective, social, and subjective 
worlds (respectively). Ideally, this flows back into the lifeworld of  modern individuals through processes of  
translation, resulting in the release of  rational potentials into cultural knowledge, social integration, and 
socialised personalities.
In a systematic sense, then, Habermas’s reservations about autonomous art are the specification in the aesthetic 
sphere of  his broader critique of  the colonisation of  the lifeworld by the system. I want to call this the dialectic 
of  autonomous art, and what I mean by this is the process whereby an art that has become autonomous 
must defend itself  from systematic and pragmatic pressures by becoming increasingly inaccessible to popular 
reception. As expert criteria of  artistic value develop historically, they depart more and more from those aesthetic 
norms that previous developments have deposited in mass consciousness, so that the familiar Habermasian 
critique of  cultural knowledge locked up in expert specialisations because of  lop-sided rationalisation also takes 
shape in the aesthetic field.
In explicating the situation that I have called the dialectic of  autonomous art, Habermas identifies four stages 
in the cultural rationalisation of  the aesthetic sphere within modernity, where, as art separates from religion and 
from science and morality, distinct aesthetic values are precipitated and art is institutionalised as a culturally 
differentiated activity. The argument here is that, on the one hand, aesthetic values do not stand still at beauty 
and the sublime, but instead, “with regard to value enhancement in the aesthetic domain, the idea of  progress 
fades into that of  renewal and rediscovery, an innovative revivification of  authentic experiences.”43 On the 
other hand, though, as aesthetic innovation (the twentieth century) replaces beauty (the eighteenth century) and 
sublimity (the nineteenth century), the rise of  market-driven bourgeois cultural affirmations of  conventional 
identities and experiences calcifies popular understanding of  the arts at a now superseded stage. This locks the 
avant-garde into the negative posture of  a protest movement, and modernism into increasing hermeticism, so 
that expert judgements on aesthetic innovation are at odds with mass expectations of  aesthetic beauty.44 
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For Habermas, the Renaissance begins the process of  the secularisation of  art through the emergence of  
commercial theatres and publishing, and this comes with the recognition of  aesthetic beauty as something 
that is only articulated to truth and goodness, rather than indissolubly bound to them in a unity. With the 
Enlightenment and then Romanticism, aesthetic beauty acquires conceptual independence and the sublime 
emerges alongside it as an aesthetic value, something that is institutionalised in the republic of  letters 
(literary public sphere) and official museums. By the end of  the nineteenth century and the beginning of  the 
twentieth century, however, art-for-art’s-sake (aestheticism) and then modernism break definitively with ethical 
requirements on the artwork while catalysing the emergence of  counter-cultural movements oriented by a 
hedonistic renunciation of  bourgeois lifestyles. Habermas characterises this as a protest on behalf  of  the victims 
of  bourgeois rationalisation and a rejection of  instrumental rationality that, however, cannot have structure-
forming effects on society because of  its lack of  institutionalisation. Instead, both modernism and realism 
are institutionalised as high art within the increasingly isolated enclosure of  museum cultures and a literary 
public sphere polarised between elite artefacts and popular entertainment. In this context, the twentieth century 
witnesses the emergence of  the desperate strategies of  the avant-gardes, together with the development of  mass 
cultural alternatives to autonomous art in the entertainment industries of  the mass media.45 These empirical 
developments make Habermas sceptical toward the capacity of  autonomous art to bring about in practice the 
shifts in motivational dispositions that it is theoretically capable of  achieving. 
THE EXPRESSIVE DIMENSION OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
From the theoretical perspective, of  course, the crucial question is whether autonomous art can in principle 
promote the post-traditional motivational dispositions that are the affective component of  what Habermas 
calls a mature ego identity. To summarise, in relation to art, in the essays and books that develop the 
positions eventually systematised in the theory of  communicative action, Habermas had inflected the basic 
Frankfurt School aesthetic tradition in a Weberian direction and linked this to a reading of  psychoanalysis 
as a depth hermeneutic rather than a science of  libidinal energies and quasi-biological drives. The result is 
a striking position on autonomous art that argues that increasingly reflexive aesthetic movements contribute 
to the cultural knowledge developed in the aesthetic cultural sphere through “value enhancement,” that is, 
by developing a progressive sequence of  distinct artistic values. These reflect an experimental logic whose 
referent is the subjective world of  inner nature, so that by mapping cultural need-interpretations in increasingly 
reflexive terms, art movements make an irreplaceable contribution to modern subjectivity. Specifically, artistic 
knowledge reflects a reflexive relation to cultural traditions in the interpretation of  feelings and desires, so that 
self-reflexive art potentially develops a post-traditional set of  motivational dispositions in modern individuals. 
Habermas’s reconstruction of  modern art history in terms of  a dialectic of  autonomous art had led him to 
express reservations about the ability of  these highly developed aesthetic movements to actually break through 
reified cultural conditions. And nothing in the lead up to the theory of  communicative action had suggested 
theoretical reservations about art’s ability to influence the lifeworld. But in TCA, Habermas does express theoretical 
reservations about whether institutionalised art can generate social learning processes that lead to post-
traditional motivational dispositions.
Now, in the theory of  communicative action, Habermas grounds the process of  cultural rationalisation (the 
separation of  cultural value spheres) in a typology of  dimensions of  communicative action, because the 
systematic intention behind TCA is to legitimate modernity as a (potentially) rational society. In light of  the 
way that the architecture of  TCA is connected with the broad intention of  a defence of  modernity, Habermas’s 
reservations about the potential of  autonomous art to generate “structure-forming effects” in the lifeworld is an 
extremely serious problem. The opposition between system and lifeworld, strategic action and communicative 
reason, that frames TCA is intended to analytically separate reification and rationalisation, whilst diagnosing 
the social pathologies that colonisation of  the lifeworld by the system, and one-sided cognitive-instrumental 
rationalisation, have introduced into cultural modernity. That claim stands or falls on the idea that the 
rationality potentials of  well-rounded cultural rationalisation could—were it not for an imbalanced relation 
between system and lifeworld—produce rationality gains. This, in turn, depends on the relationships in each 
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of  science, morals, and art, and their referential world, dimension of  communicative action, validity claim, 
institutionalised learning process, and the structure-forming effect in the lifeworld that all of  this has. Because 
this is complex and abstract, but susceptible to schematised simplification, let me at once represent it as a table 
(dropping law, which Habermas later repositions in Between Facts and Norms (1996)):
REFERENTIAL 
WORLD
DIMENSION OF 
COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION
VALIDITY CLAIM 
AS PART OF 
COMMUNICATIVE 
REASON
CULTURAL 
VALUE SPHERE 
= INSTITUTION-
ALISED LEARNING 
PROCESS
STRUCTURE-
FORMING EFFECT 
OF EXPERT 
KNOWLEDGE
Objective Cognitive Truth Science Decentred cognition 
(formal-operational 
hypothetical attitudes 
to objective nature)
Social Normative Rightness Morality Normative 
universality (post-
conventional moral 
discourses on the 
social world)  
Subjective Expressive Truthfulness Art/criticism
?
Given that clearly, according to my reconstruction of  Habermas, what belongs in the final box is “post-
traditional motivations (reflexively critical relation to cultural need-interpretations),” why is there a question mark 
in the crucial box? 
It is, of  course, Habermas’s implied question mark, and it arises for one, central reason: the validity claims 
constitutive of  communicative reason must be capable of  yielding a rationally-binding universal agreement, so that 
the institutionalisation of  these validity claims in distinct cultural spheres can produce a social learning process 
with the potential to be disseminated to all members of  a lifeworld. Simply, but devastatingly, Habermas is 
not confident that the validity-claim of  truthfulness can generate intersubjective agreements that are either 
rationally binding or that extend beyond particular communities.
This must not be conflated with a lack of  confidence in the ability of  aesthetic attitudes to promote learning 
processes that have a structure-forming effect on the lifeworld, say, because the dialectic of  autonomy leads to 
hermetic modernism or because evanescent counter-cultures only express a hedonistic protest against bourgeois 
rationalisation. Habermas does say that counter-cultural social movements “do not form structures that are 
rationalisable in and of  themselves, but are parasitic in that they remain dependent on innovations in the 
other spheres of  value,” which means only that these derive from aesthetic vanguards.46 More confusingly, 
Habermas thinks that the “expressive attitude” to the subjective world is the province of  erotics (and therefore 
of  psychotherapy), whereas the same attitude to the objective world yields art (and therefore also art criticism).47 
That is inconsistent with what I take to be the basic architectural intention of  the theory of  communicative 
action, which should state that both art and erotics spring from an expressive attitude toward the subjective 
world—and are, in fact, not entirely distinct. But it is in any case difficult to tell whether that is an aberration 
on part of  Habermas, or his explication of  Weber, because this point in TCA, which has considerably exercised 
the critics,48 is a critical exposition of  Weberian sociology. At any rate, the difficulty in institutionalising the 
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validity claim of  truthfulness is an intrinsic problem to do with the way that the aesthetic cultural value sphere is 
conceptualised, rather than an extrinsic problem of  the effects of  reification on the lifeworld.
What is it, then, about the expressive dimension of  communicative action that makes it seem flaky as a bearer for 
the major intentions of  Habermas’s defence of  modernity? The expressive dimension dramatises for the social 
world the subjective world of  the speaker, something that arises in speech pragmatics when actors implicitly 
relate action proposals to a value-consensus and common interests.49 In terms that develop the argument of  the 
essay “Moral Development and Ego Identity,” Habermas characterises the subjective world of  the speaker in 
terms of  “the two sides of  a partiality rooted in needs,” namely, beliefs and intentions, and desires and feelings.50 
The implicit claim to the truthfulness of  a speaker’s representation of  their interior states is redeemed through 
arguments about the sincerity of  the speaker (their truthful representation of  beliefs and intentions) and the 
authenticity of  their needs (the interpretive legitimacy in light of  communally accepted value standards of  the 
desires and feelings they seek to realise through the proposed action).51 
While sincerity claims are redeemed non-discursively, through an examination of  the consistency of  the 
speaker’s behaviour with their represented beliefs and intentions, authenticity claims are redeemed discursively 
through debates about the cultural legitimacy of  their represented desires and feelings, together with 
reflexive argumentation about the appropriateness of  the value standards at work in this cultural process of  
interpretation.52 The truthfulness claim—as “authenticity”—is thoroughly intersubjective and presupposes not 
just an accurate reflection of  the speaker’s subjective world, but also a reflective relation between the speaker 
and their own interiority (the desires and feelings are not self-deceptions, and, the desires and feelings are 
either culturally legitimate, or the speaker has good reasons for proposing a new standard of  evaluation). 
Indeed, Habermas proposes that “we call a person rational who interprets the nature of  his desires and feelings 
[Bedürfnisnatur] in the light of  culturally established standards of  value, but especially if  he can adopt a reflective 
attitude to the very value standards through which desires and feelings are interpreted.”53
ART/CRITICISM AND VALIDITY CLAIMS
Habermas, then, has articulated his arguments about aesthetic values, need interpretations and motivational 
dispositions in terms of  the validity claim of  authenticity. Art and criticism, on this account, arise through 
specialisation in the logic of  the articulation and redemption of  the validity claim of  authenticity, freed from 
pragmatic constraints and protected from the intrusive predominance of  the validity claims of  cognitive truth 
and normative rightness. That means two things. First, against a misconception that vitiates David Colclasure’s 
interpretation of  literary rationality, artworks do not raise pragmatically binding action proposals54—they are not 
a form of  communicative action, but a part of  communicative reason (i.e., a part of  reasoned argumentation). 
Second, art and criticism together articulate and redeem authenticity claims—specifically, artworks non-
propositionally articulate such claims, and criticism redeems these claims argumentatively. 
What prevents Habermas from stating the matter in precisely these terms are his reservations about the non-
binding and non-propositional nature of  judgements of  taste. Although aesthetic critique involves the disclosure 
of  silenced needs through a critical evaluation of  conventional value standards, Habermas insists that even 
the post-traditional “cultural values do not appear with a claim to universality, as do norms of  action—at 
most, values are candidates for interpretations, under which a circle of  those affected can … normatively 
regulate a common interest.”55 Furthermore, the perception of  a work as an aesthetic experience involves a 
virtuous circularity, whereby the artwork itself  can promote acceptance of  the very standards it is taken to be 
an “argument” for.56 
The problem, in other words, is that reflexive judgements seem to happen within particular communities in 
ways that claim only subjective universality, and that therefore cannot command universal agreement. 
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For this reason, Habermas proposes a distinction between the non-universal or non-binding character of  
aesthetic (and ethical and therapeutic) critique, and cognitive, normative and explicative discourse, in which 
“the meaning of  the problematic validity claim conceptually forces participants to suppose that a rationally 
motivated agreement could in principle be achieved.”57 It is this discourse/critique distinction that blows a 
hole in the conceptual architecture of  the theory of  communicative action and leads me to place a problematic 
question mark in the box (above) that represents the structure-forming effect of  aesthetic specialisation on the 
lifeworld. 
But is it really necessary to deny the institution of  art and criticism the ability to achieve a universal agreement?
First of  all, Habermas does not mean by discourse “logical demonstration.” Discourse refers to an informal, 
pragmatic logic of  rational argumentation,58 which can be characterised:
From the process perspective, by the intention of  convincing a universal audience and gaining general 
assent for an utterance; from the procedural perspective, by the intention of  ending a dispute about 
hypothetical validity claims with a rationally motivated agreement; and from the product perspective 
by the intention of  grounding or redeeming a validity claim with arguments.59 
I fully agree that artworks alone cannot do this. But Habermas misses a major opportunity by not following up 
on his insight into the discursive character of  explicative claims, that is, claims to the coherence of  symbolic 
constructs.60 Although coherence claims can be raised in a formal sense in relation to any discourse, the specific 
nature of  the critical interpretation of  artworks is understood by Habermas in terms of  an understanding of  
what is said, not just of  the formal properties of  how it is said. The interpreter of  a literary work, for instance, 
discloses the meaning of  a text “against the background of  the cognitive, moral, and expressive elements of  
the cultural store of  knowledge” forming the work’s horizon of  expectations. But “the interpreter cannot 
understand the semantic content of  the text if  he is not in a position to present to himself  the reasons that the 
author might have been able to adduce in defence of  his utterances under suitable conditions.”61 What that 
means is that explicative claims in relation to literary texts are not just discussions of  the formal properties of  
interpretations. (Are they logically consistent?) Instead, they are reconstructions of  the legitimacy of  the validity claims 
implicit in the work, in terms that can demand a more general assent than that which the author themselves might have aimed at. 
Centrally, in the contemporary context, that must mean the claim to have identified in a work an innovative 
presentation of  a post-traditional need-interpretation. 
My position, then, is that art criticism argumentatively redeems the authenticity claim that artworks implicitly 
(“mutely,” Adorno would say) articulate, by exhibiting these before a potentially universal audience as well-
formed and intelligible instances of  cultural need-interpretations, whose legitimacy potentially transcends this 
or that particular community. 
Once the artworks in question themselves articulate post-traditional need interpretations, then the interpretation 
of  these works as symbolically coherent and culturally legitimate has directly universal implications, because 
it points to (1) the context-transcending force of  the implied claim of  the work through (2) the decentred and 
unbound character of  the subjectivity promoted by the aesthetic experience. 
The contemporary form of  the authenticity claim that art criticism redeems is therefore the claim that a 
symbolic construct:
1. Innovatively presents a post-traditional need interpretation, which;
2. Everybody can potentially feel, irrespective of  cultural background. 
Aesthetic modernism, then, really does shake the foundations of  conventional methods of  representation 
and structures of  subjectivity—rigid ego identities, Habermas would say—because it stakes a claim to artistic 
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truthfulness with universal implications for both aesthetic techniques and motivational dispositions. 
Now, this way of  thinking is not completely alien to Habermas’s own. He proposes that art criticism conforms 
to the pragmatic logic of  argumentation and then adds that:
There is an unmistakeable indicator for the fact that a certain type of  ‘knowing’ is objectified in 
artworks, albeit in a different way than in theoretical discourse or in legal or moral representations. 
… Art criticism has developed forms of  argumentation that specifically differentiate it from the 
argumentative forms of  theoretical and moral-practical discourse.62 
Unfortunately, though, Habermas insists that the learning process in question is exclusively in the works 
themselves and not the critical debates, for only the artworks are the locus of  “directed and cumulative 
transformations” in “those aesthetic experiences which only a decentered, unbound subjectivity is capable 
of.”63 Furthermore, and equally regrettably, Habermas thinks that value enhancement in a cultural sphere must 
involve the exclusion of  other sorts of  validity claim altogether, and so he speaks of  “the purification of  the 
aesthetic from admixtures of  the cognitive, the useful and the moral.”64 That is why Habermas claims that “art 
becomes a laboratory, the critic an expert, [and] the development of  art the medium of  a learning process” that 
is not an accumulation of  epistemic contents but instead “an aesthetic ‘progress’ … a concentrically expanding, 
progressive exploration of  a realm of  possibilities opened up with the autonomisation of  art.”65
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND ART CRITICISM
My contention, then, is that Habermas unnecessarily cuts himself  off  here from a productive statement of  his 
own position by insisting that the learning process is exclusively concentrated in the artworks. He also maintains 
that aesthetic rationality excludes consideration of  cognitive and normative questions, which implies that the 
artistic cultural value sphere is an isolated silo, and that criticism is a parasitic activity that supervenes upon 
aesthetic learning processes. But a learning process devoid of  epistemic contents is no learning process at all. It 
is an experience of  unrestricted play that exercises—but does not form—flexible ego identities. That can only 
mean that the theory of  aesthetic rationality as part of  communicative reason is incorrect: 
The aesthetic ‘validity’ or ‘unity’ that we attribute to a work of  art refers to its singularly illuminating 
power to open our eyes to what is seemingly familiar, to disclose anew an apparently familiar 
reality. This validity claim admittedly stands for a potential for ‘truth’ that can be released only in 
the whole complexity of  life-experience; therefore, this ‘truth-potential’ may not be connected to 
(or even identified with) one of  the three validity-claims constitutive for communicative action, as 
I have previously been inclined to maintain. The one-to-one relationship which exists between the 
prescriptive validity of  a norm and the normative validity claims raised in speech acts is not a proper 
model for the relation between the potential for truth of  works of  art and the transformed relations 
between self  and world stimulated by aesthetic experience.66 
What this means is that communicative reason must be restricted to cognitive truth and normative rightness. 
Although Habermas elsewhere acknowledges that art criticism is discursive and that it translates the decentred 
experiences of  autonomous artworks into the prosaic language of  the modern lifeworld,67 these insights are 
connected to a completely different understanding of  art. Unfortunately, there is widespread critical agreement 
that Habermas’s latest understanding of  art and literature, as institutions that “administer capacities of  world-
disclosure” through the articulation and criticism of  poetic language, is entirely unsatisfactory.68 
What Habermas is seeking to do justice to in shifting position is not only the problematic status of  aesthetic 
critique, but also the fact that when aesthetic experience is integrated into the narrative of  a life history, it goes 
beyond “renewing the interpretation of  needs that colour perceptions.” Rather, “it reaches into our cognitive 
interpretations and normative expectation and transforms the totality in which these moments are related to 
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each other.”69 That means, Habermas argues, that the illuminating power of  art relates to the totality, rather 
than to reflexivity, so that “modern art harbours a utopia” only insofar as it is a mimesis of  the desire for “a 
balanced and undistorted intersubjectivity in everyday life” that remains to come.70 Acknowledgement of  this 
situation, Habermas thinks, means that Albrecht Wellmer is right that:
Neither truth nor truthfulness may be attributed unmetaphorically to works of  art, if  one understands 
‘truth’ and ‘truthfulness’ in the sense of  a pragmatically differentiated everyday concept of  truth. 
We can explain the way in which truth and truthfulness—and even normative correctness—are 
metaphorically interlaced in works of  art only by appealing to the fact that the work of  art, as a 
symbolic formation with an aesthetic validity claim, is at the same time an object of  an experience, in 
which the three validity domains are unmetaphorically intermeshed.71
In other words, Habermas thinks he must decide between art as mimesis of  life in its totality and art as an 
exploration of  need interpretations alone. 
Actually, though, there is no need to make this decision, and hence no need for his concession. For Habermas 
does not in fact hold that aesthetic rationality exists in a hermetically sealed cultural silo marked “explorations of  
inner nature only.” As David Ingram points out, Habermas’s advocacy of  the post-avant-garde is predicted on 
this art movement’s ability to integrate cognitive and normative developments into aesthetic experimentation.72 
The clear implication is that cultural value spheres form around the predominance of  a validity claim, not the 
exclusion of  all else, which is why, for instance, “nonobjectivist approaches to research within the human sciences 
bring viewpoints of  moral and aesthetic critique to bear, without this threatening the primacy of  questions of  
truth.”73 
To be certain, when aesthetic experience illuminates an individual’s life history and problem situations in the way 
that Habermas mentions, we are dealing with a holistic relation to reality, which can indeed best be described 
as a “truth potential” rather than a differentiated validity claim. But what is surprising—or problematic—
about that? The individual whose identification with an artwork is sufficiently strong to have integrated its 
implications directly into their subjectivity has simply “jumped the gun” on the process of  aesthetic debate 
that is mediated by the apparatus of  professional criticism. Without waiting for intersubjective validation of  
the cultural need-interpretations that inflect the cognitive and normative elements of  reality, as represented in 
the artwork, the individual has gone ahead and drawn all of  the necessary conclusions at a personal level. That 
is an important and legitimate process, one that necessitates a hermeneutics of  aesthetic experience if  we are 
to fully understand the process of  reception. But it is, after all, only a restatement of  the difference between 
art appreciation by individuals, and the discursive and intersubjective process of  art criticism through public 
debate. A salient example of  the mediating role of  art criticism and its difference from popular appreciation is 
the debate on modernism sparked by the obscenity trials of  Lawrence and Joyce, where public reception was 
mostly negative, whereas professional critics supported these works on grounds of  their literary excellence.74 
Perhaps, we might speculate, Habermas’s over-riding concerns with truth as warranted assertion and with the 
normative foundations of  social theory meant that his own art theory did not receive the full attention that it 
deserved.
In any case, within a few years of  TCA and its subsequent revision, Habermas had shifted position again, this time 
through an acknowledgement of  the existence of  a world-disclosing aspect of  language that is supplementary 
to the three dimensions of  communicative reason already mapped out. Because of  the problematic status of  
aesthetic rationality—and perhaps also in order to contain the implications of  this new position in relation to 
the still extant cognitive and normative positions—world-disclosing language is represented by Habermas in 
The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity (1985) as a specification of  poetics. Pieter Duvenage, JM Bernstein, and 
Nikolas Kompridis have drawn attention to the major problems with this position.75 As Duvenage points out, if  
poetic language-use is an aspect of  everyday speech, and speech acts are the bearers of  rationality, then there 
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is a world-disclosing aspect to reason itself. There are no grounds for restricting this world-disclosing aspect of  
reason to artworks alone and describing it as aesthetic rationality, as if  this “aesthetic” aspect to reason only 
happened in a small domain. Consideration of  Duvenage’s superbly cogent proposal for “the reciprocity of  
world-disclosure and discursive language,” however, would take this discussion too far afield.76 For now, it is 
sufficient to note that the discursive/communicative reason, which world-disclosure is complementary to, can 
indeed include aesthetic rationality, considered under its aspect of  intersubjective debates on cultural need-
interpretations.  
CODA
There is a lot to criticise in Habermas’s position. We might start with three major ones: the retreat from a 
prolongation of  the democratic socialist intentions of  the first generation of  the Frankfurt School to a mere 
species of  political liberalism; the preference for ego psychology, with its anti-Freudian reinstatement of  the 
ego as the core of  human being, over every other programme in psychoanalysis; and the notion that system 
processes in economics and administration represent norm-free zones of  strategic activity. But there is also 
a lot to learn from: the post-metaphysical perspective on philosophy and the intersubjective turn, and the 
foundations of  a theory of  intersubjectivity in language pragmatics; and the construction of  an emancipatory 
social theory that nonetheless acknowledges that system complexity means the end of  revolutionary utopias 
and also the end of  the notion that politics constitutes society. In the midst of  all this, I have argued, there is 
also a restatement of  the Frankfurt School aesthetic tradition—that art is all about human needs—in post-
metaphysical terms. According to this perspective, modern art stakes a claim to truthfulness that cannot and 
should not be ignored—that is a position worth extending and defending.
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